Professional Ethics and NDAs: Contracts as lies and abuse? by Moorhead, R
16 
Professional Ethics and NDAs:  
Contracts as Lies and Abuse? 




Catharine MacMillan’s chapter in this volume takes us 
comprehensively and critically though contractual doctrine relevant 
to non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).1 She points to the potential for 
serious abuse; the weakness in relying on the ‘emancipating effect’ of 
outside advice; and especially the potential for challenge because of 
duress or  illegality.2 Her analysis presents a challenge from within 
contract law to judges and lawyers who see these agreements 
primarily in terms of freedom of contract.3 I wish to present a 
challenge more external to contract law: a challenge posed by 
professional ethics. The paucity of challenge to NDAs from within 
contract is partly a function of the complexity of the law, but more 
likely the result of structural inequalities presented by rich, well-
resourced individuals deploying canny drafters and vigorous 
‘reputation management’ teams. Professional regulation poses 
challenges that lawyers, but also judges, as interpreters of contracts, 
need to take more seriously. As MacMillan also reminds us, NDAs 
enable cloaks of secrecy to be thrown over sometimes serious 
wrongdoing in areas of public interest as wide-ranging as health, 
education, policing and the Church.4 It is in the silencing of women 
harassed and attacked by men that they have gained their most 
telling notoriety. The movie producer Harvey Weinstein and the 
retailer Philip Green are now synonymous with NDAs and the #metoo 
movement. At a charitable President’s Dinner event, employed 
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hostesses were, ‘groped, sexually harassed and propositioned’.5 In 
apparent anticipation, they were asked to sign NDAs, which they did 
not have time to read and were not allowed to keep.6  
 I shall focus, in particular, on the Green and Weinstein cases, 
showing with regard to the former that whilst balancing key rights, 
privacy and the rights of the press in the public interest, upholding 
contracts has so far trumped in law but may not in professional 
ethics.7 I shall explain how the judges in that case failed to consider a 
key and, I would argue, inappropriate clause in giving Philip Green’s 
NDA a clean bill of health. In outline, the arguments are that the 
contract asserted rights that did not exist, asked for warranties that 
could not be enforced and sought indemnities that should not be 
paid (as penalties). Its terms were, in professionally punishable ways, 
likely to be lies and abuse. I use it as an example of how, when 
negotiating contracts that misstate the law or take unfair advantage 
of their client’s opponents, lawyers are in professionally punishable 
ways cheating on their clients’ behalf. 
 I highlight some of the professional ethics dimensions of 
NDAs and how those agreements might, on the facts as known, 
instantiate criminal offences. I am conscious that such arguments are 
challenging ones. Some will recoil with an emotional intensity. It is 
unseemly in the extreme to suggest that reputable lawyers might be 
liars, cheats, even criminals. But those arguments stand up on the 
facts as known. Equally, because the facts are not all known, I do not 
assert that criminal offences have been committed here. That would 
require a rounded consideration of all the facts by a jury. And such 
facts are not available to us. There is, however, a colourable claim 
that offences have been committed on the face of those agreements.  
 My interest in this illegality is not to seek prosecution, or to 
shame individuals, but to show how far into serious professional 
misconduct the drafting of bad contracts may take us. I consider 
along the way some of the other potential professional misconduct 
problems highlighted by the two case studies: those of Zelda Perkins 
and Philip Green. 
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I. Zelda Perkins 
Zelda Perkins left her job with Miramax in 1998, following allegations 
that Harvey Weinstein had attempted to rape a colleague of hers and 
repeatedly sexually harassed her. Weinstein denies allegations of 
non-consensual sex or acts of retaliation against any women for 
refusing his advances.8 Having spoken out publicly,9 Perkins gave 
written and oral evidence to the House of Commons Women and 
Equalities Committee (WESC) as part of their investigation into sexual 
harassment in the workplace.10  
 Simons Muirhead and Burton (SMB) represented Perkins. A 
recently qualified solicitor conducted the negotiations with Miramax 
and Weinstein. Those negotiations were hosted and conducted by 
Allen and Overy, with a lawyer from Miramax also present.  
 Advised against seeking Weinstein’s prosecution, Perkins and 
her colleague understood that they ‘had no option’ other than 
settlement, with stringent NDAs.11 At Perkins’ insistence, SMB 
requested £250,000 in compensation (her salary was about £20,000 
at the time and her colleague’s was £16,000, so well in excess of one 
year’s income).12 Although SMB thought this unrealistic, the request 
was accepted subject to negotiation of terms. Those negotiations 
apparently concentrated on the Weinstein team pushing Perkins to 
name each person she had spoken to about her claims, and Perkins 
seeking undertakings that Weinstein would attend psychological 
therapy and that Miramax would institute policies to protect future 
complaints within the firm.  
 Perkins describes the assistant solicitor who conducted the 
negotiations – albeit sometimes with a more experienced barrister 
on hand for advice – as, ‘utterly out of their depth’,13 and the 
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negotiating sessions as gruelling, intimidating and frightening. One 
session ran ‘from 5pm until 5am’. A week after the negotiation, 
Perkins and her colleague were brought back to a meeting at which 
Weinstein was present, to sign the agreement. She said:  
 He had a long conversation with us, trying to bring us back to 
 the company and apologising for his behaviour. In fact, it was 
 almost a full admission, which my lawyer noted. He was then 
 not allowed to leave the room with that piece of paper unless 
 it was destroyed.14  
She was not allowed to keep a copy of the agreement. 
A. The Weinstein-Perkins Agreement 
An extract from the NDA has been published.15 Beyond that, most of 
what we have heard about the agreement comes from Zelda Perkins. 
Mark Mansell, the partner from Allen & Overy (A&O) responsible for 
drafting it, declined to comment on the agreement specifically 
because of client confidentiality. He did provide comments that tell 
us quite a bit about the agreement, though, because he commented 
generically on agreements ‘like it’ whilst also indicating the 
agreement was unusual, in some ways exceptionally so.16 Thus, we 
learn that refusing a copy for one of the parties ‘would be extremely 
rare – very, very rare’. He could think of no other case where non-
disclosure required a medical practitioner to sign an NDA before 
treating the woman. And a condition that a signatory cannot get 
further legal advice without having another NDA with that lawyer 
‘would not be normal’. Long overnight negotiations, whilst 
sometimes justified, he indicated, would not be at all usual. Similarly, 
opponents would never be present in the same room in a 
negotiation, only in a mediation. That background given, let us turn 
first to looking at some of the actual clauses. 
 Of crucial significance is clause 6(a). It requires Perkins to 
keep any information she has confidential unless she has, ‘ the prior 
written consent of Harvey Weinstein or Bob Weinstein’. And any 
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legal advice on the agreement she receives must be given under an 
NDA approved by Miramax. Even then, disclosure is expressly 
prohibited 
except to any entity if required by legal process … but you 
will first, in the case of any civil legal process and where 
reasonably practicable in the case of any criminal legal 
process, give not less than forty eight (48) hours prior written 
notice to the Company through Mark Mansell at Allen & 
Overy before making any such disclosure and if any disclosure 
is made you will use all reasonable endeavours to limit the 
scope of the disclosure as far as possible. You agree to provide 
reasonable assistance to the Company and its legal advisers if 
it elects to contest such legal process. In the event that the 
Company does not contest such legal process or the challenge 
is not successful, you may make disclosure to your legal 
advisors (who must first agree in writing to execute a 
confidentiality agreement in a form satisfactory to the 
Company in the form of paragraph 6) but you will use all 
reasonable endeavours to limit the scope of the disclosure to 
your legal advisors as far as possible.  
 
So, written consent is needed to make any disclosures voluntarily. 
Disclosure must only be given in legal proceedings if Perkins is 
required to do so. And any attempt to compel Perkins through legal 
process has to be notified to Miramax. Any disclosure has to be as 
limited in scope as possible (presumably in discussion with Miramax 
and/or Weinstein, or Perkins would be required to guess for herself 
what is necessary), but prior to that, she must provide any assistance 
asked for in Miramax’s contesting her being so compelled. Notably, 
the clause envisages notification and contestation taking place prior 
to her seeking legal advice.  
 The clause thus prevents Perkins from making a criminal 
complaint. If Perkins wished unilaterally to disclose information to 
the police, under the agreement she would need the Weinsteins’ 
permission in writing. Similarly, Perkins cannot instigate civil legal 
process or respond voluntarily to others who do so.  
 It might be argued that she could ask for consent and the 
Weinsteins would have to grant it because to do otherwise might 
pervert the course of justice. To know this was possible, she would 
presumably need legal advice.17 This would be rendered difficult 
because she was refused a full copy of the agreement. Perkin’s new 
solicitor might also object to advising under an NDA on the basis that 
it would compromise their independence and ability to represent the 
client’s best interests.  
 Even when cooperating with lawful process, the clause 
permits disclosure by Perkins only if she is required to cooperate. 
Ordinarily, a witness is not required to give evidence to the police. 
Preventing Perkins from giving evidence voluntarily thus rules out the 
dominant means by which the police would investigate such matters. 
If a witness refuses to cooperate having been approached, there is a 
strong likelihood the police would not proceed to investigate the lead 
– they cannot compel a witness to give evidence, short of arresting 
them for the offence under investigation and seeking to interview 
them (and then the arrestee can remain silent).18  
 Similarly, in civil matters, such as a claim by a fellow 
employee that Weinstein had harassed them, civil litigants could 
issue a witness summons to require Perkins to give evidence but 
would not know what her evidence would be, and might have to 
contend with the potential for well-resourced objections from 
Miramax.  
 To take the matter further, how would a potential litigant or 
prosecutor know to compel Perkins as a witness? They would want to 
know, in broad terms, what Perkins would be likely to say before 
considering compelling her to give evidence at trial. If they 
summoned her to give evidence, that would raise a suspicion that 
Perkins had already breached the NDA. In this way, Perkins would 
likely feel at risk of breaching the NDA if she had even intimated 
willingness to talk if compelled. 
 Even if these hurdles are overcome, the requirements to limit 
disclosure suggest significant opportunities to inhibit and shape 
Perkins’ giving of evidence. There is potential, for instance, for a 
requirement not to disclose more than is necessary to have a 
significant chilling effect on any evidence given. 
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18 It is possible for potential witnesses to be compelled to give evidence by a 
magistrates’ court, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, sch 3, para 4, but this 
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 In this way, the dominant, likely impact of the clause is to 
effectively preclude Perkins from cooperating with either civil or 
criminal process. Even in the unlikely event that cooperation were to 
be compelled, that cooperation is inhibited and the agreement buys 
time, and opportunities for intervention, for Miramax/Weinstein in 
the process.  
 Mark Mansell only hints at an explanation for the onerous 
agreement, saying agreements may be more extensive where high-
profile public figures have particular sensitivities around reputation. 
Mark Mansell also concedes, ‘it would not be either reasonable or 
lawful to prevent somebody from participating in a criminal process’. 
As we have seen, the agreement seems plainly intended to influence 
whether, when and how any such participation takes place. In 
particular, he suggests that a clause could legitimately be used to 
prevent certain kinds of confidential information being given to the 
police: ‘information being disclosed that is not necessary for that 
process, [such that] the individual who is seeking to protect those 
interests has an opportunity to be involved’.19 
 In seeking an opportunity for a suspect to be involved in 
guarding the evidence of a witness, the opportunities to apply 
pressure to Perkins are clear. Unfortunately, it is not implausible that 
leading lawyers would engage in such pressure. Indeed, other 
partners in Mansell’s firm in a different case have been so 
implicated.20 Any time or information gained during this opportunity 
might enable Weinstein’s teamto spread their efforts to understand 
who the other complainants against Weinstein might be – apparently 
a key element of the original settlement negotiations.21 This might 
suggest a wider attempt to control evidence as well as adverse 
publicity. They may, although this is speculation, also have NDAs 
against some of the other witnesses to whom the prosecution have 
spoken, which they may similarly seek to enforce. 
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II. Might the Use of This Kind of Clause 
Amount to Perverting the Course of Justice? 
The offence of perverting the course of justice (PTCoJ) is committed 
where someone (i) acts or embarks upon a course of conduct, (ii) 
which has a tendency to and (iii) is intended to pervert (iv) the course 
of public justice.22 Does the Zelda Perkins clause, given evidence on 
the context, give rise to a concern that the offence may be made 
out? 
 An NDA clearly constitutes a positive act. A tendency to 
pervert the course of justice requires, ‘a possibility that what the 
accused has done “without more” might lead to injustice’.23 There is 
an obvious risk that an NDA in the above terms ‘without more’ leads 
to an injustice. Perkins is likely prevented from reporting and 
inhibited from cooperating with police enquiries. Indeed, if my 
construction of the clause is accepted, it operates to preclude 
disclosure of evidence to the police pre-charge. And it is likely to 
shape the nature of any disclosure. A potential suspect is empowered 
to limit or shape criminal proceedings. Plainly, PTCoJ covers 
concealing or destroying evidence with intent to influence criminal 
investigations and preventing a witness giving evidence. Agreeing to 
conceal a crime prior to an investigation is also capable of being 
PTCoJ. In many ways, the NDA’s practical impact is similar. 
 As for intention, it is not necessary to show dishonesty. What 
has to be shown is that the act complained of has a tendency to 
pervert the course of justice and that the defendant intended it to do 
so. It is not necessary to show the wrongdoer believed they were 
acting through unlawful means but that they had engaged in ‘the 
intentional doing of an act having a tendency, when objectively 
considered, to pervert the course of justice’.24 
 The test would be, then, whether the inhibiting of Zelda 
Perkin’s disclosures to the police was intended to affect the course of 
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justice. There are a number of reasons for thinking that it was. The 
agreement was intended to reduce substantially the likelihood of 
information from Zelda Perkins, or from any of the other people she 
has spoken to, coming to the attention of the police or third parties. 
Whilst this intention might be sufficiently evidenced by the 
agreement itself, the broader attempts to identify who Perkins has 
spoken to, and the wider history of Weinstein’s conduct being ‘widely 
known’, would likely be relevant.25  
 The more the lawyers involved can distance themselves from 
such knowledge, and the more plausibly they can mount the case 
that the NDA was solely aimed at protecting reputation rather than 
inhibiting the flow of information to the police, the less likely the 
intention is made out. We should not dismiss out of hand the 
possibility that controlling information that goes to the police might 
be legitimate. After all, the police sometimes use information 
inappropriately during investigations.26 However, it is not enough to 
claim that protection of reputation was one of the aims. If a 
substantial aim was also to inhibit or shape a police investigation, this 
is enough, potentially, for an offence to be made out. 
 Similarly, whilst it would be argued that the NDA was part of 
a normal and legitimate strategy for managing sexual harassment 
allegations, it may not be enough that the strategy was potentially 
legitimate. Even if the agreement is lawful, this is not in and of itself a 
protection against a criminal charge. By way of example, in contempt 
cases, a solicitor’s employing lawful threats improperly has been 
found to amount to contempt.27 A lawful threat, or exercise of a legal 
right, can constitute an act intended to pervert the course of justice, 
‘if the end in view is improper’.28 What matters is the intent behind 
the NDA, not the lawfulness of the agreement (and in any event the 
lawfulness of this agreement is in doubt). Influencing justice through 
a respectable solicitor is not a prophylactic against prosecution. 
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26 The disclosure of confidential information from the police investigation of the 
former minister Damian Green and the televised investigation of Cliff Richard come 
to mind. 
27 Re Martin (P), The Times (DC, 23 April 1986). 
28 R v Toney; R v Ali [1993] 1 WLR 364, (1993) 97 Cr App R 176 (CA). 
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Wrongful interference with a witness can include ‘improper 
pressure’.29 It is even possible for an intention to pervert to be found 
when improperly pressuring a dishonest witness to tell the truth.30  
 It is not certain, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that what was done here was not just dubious, it was criminal. Under 
Crown Prosecution Service guidance, prosecutors bringing such case 
also have to satisfy themselves that there are serious aggravating 
features.31 And any defence might seek to argue that applying PTCoJ 
in such circumstances is an extension of the offence into new 
territory, which should only be done cautiously, step by step.32 The 
latter argument is weak: the analogy between what was done here 
and the simple concealing of evidence is strong, but a judge faced 
with any prosecution of reputable solicitors might be persuaded.33 
Only a trial, with fuller evidence, would be likely to decide. But my 
principal interest in making this argument is not prosecution but 
showing how far from professional principles the use of NDAs can 
lead solicitors to stray. 
III. Professional Ethics Perspectives 
What, then, of professional rules applicable to this situation? The 
Solicitors’ Code of Conduct requires solicitors to uphold the rule of 
law and the proper administration of justice. They are also required 
to: act with integrity; not allow their independence to be 
compromised; act in the best interests of each client; provide a 
proper standard of service to their clients; and behave in a way that 
maintains the trust the public places in them and in the provision of 
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legal services.34 The 10 principles are mandatory and ‘all-pervasive’.35 
And where36 ‘two or more Principles come into conflict the one which 
takes precedence is the one which best serves the public interest in 
the particular circumstances, especially the public interest in the 
proper administration of justice’.  
 An agreement found to have strayed into PTCoJ territory (as 
set out in section II) would clearly be a breach of professional 
conduct rules: at the very least, the integrity, administration of 
justice and trust obligations would be breached.  
 There are other ways of thinking about the problem, though. 
What if the agreement’s errant clauses were merely unenforceable 
rather than criminal? MacMillan’s chapter37 reminds us that 
identifying unenforceability may not be straightforward, but for now 
I want to ask the question whether putting a plainly unenforceable 
clause into a contract is a professional breach. 
 Lawyers thinking about their obligations to the 
administration of justice tend to concentrate on not attempting ‘to 
deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court’ (O(5.1) in the 
Code). This includes not being complicit in another person’s deceiving 
or misleading the court (O(5.2)). The Code’s indicative behaviours 
(IBs, ie examples of when the Code is probably breached) suggest 
that one example is ‘constructing facts supporting your client’s case 
or drafting any documents relating to any proceedings containing: (a) 
any contention which you do not consider to be properly arguable’ 
(IB(5.7)).  
 If a settlement agreement relates to any proceedings it might 
fall within this example, although a court is unlikely ever to see it and 
be misled by it. If we continue to assume that the agreement is 
unenforceable and that a lawyer could not stand up and properly 
argue that the inhibitions on Ms Perkins’ cooperation with the police 
were enforceable, can they include that term in the contract if it does 
not risk misleading the court? What might the professional rules say 
about that situation? 
 The Bar’s Code of Conduct is clearer: it recognises an 
obligation not to knowingly or recklessly mislead or attempt to 
mislead anyone (rc9.1). The new Solicitors’ Code of Conduct now 
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contains similar obligations.38 Even sbefore that, solicitors could not 
knowingly or recklessly mislead people more generally because of 
their duty to act with integrity. As the Court of Appeal recently 
opined: 
[A] solicitor conducting negotiations or a barrister making 
submissions to a judge or arbitrator will take particular care 
not to mislead. Such a professional person is expected to be 
even more scrupulous about accuracy than a member of the 
general public in daily discourse.39 
Putting an onerous, but unenforceable, clause into an agreement 
risks misleading opposing parties, either during the negotiation or 
afterwards. It might be implied that the lawyer is contending that the 
enforceability of such a clause is properly arguable by the fact of its 
inclusion. If they know it is not then they are seeking to create a 
belief in another and something which is deliberately misleading. 
Scrupulousness would demand that it is not included. It might even 
be said that they are lying if they know the clause not to be 
enforceable.  
 The need to consider one’s duty to act with integrity is 
strengthened by O(11.1), which prohibits taking ‘unfair advantage of 
third parties in either your professional or personal capacity’. This is 
supplemented by examples: IB(11.7), taking unfair advantage of an 
opposing party’s lack of legal knowledge where they have not 
instructed a lawyer; and IB(11.8), demanding anything that is not 
legally recoverable. The argument here would be that demanding 
unenforceable elements in an NDA is akin to claiming something that 
is not legally recoverable and so taking unfair advantage. 
 It could be argued that IB(11.7) indicates that unfair 
advantage problems are confined to unrepresented parties. This is 
probably a misreading. Indicative behaviours are just examples, they 
do not limit the rules. The Code does not confine the obligation to 
acting against unrepresented parties, and the SRA’s Walk the Line 
guidance talks of being ‘careful not to take unfair advantage of the 
opponent or other third parties … Special care is needed where the 
opponent is unrepresented.’40 Similarly, the SRA’s Warning Notice on 
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NDAs implies that unfair advantage can be taken of represented 
parties, by suggesting that ‘Where the employee is not represented, 
your obligations will be heightened, to ensure that there is no abuse 
of position, or unfair advantage taken.’41 
 If we assume for a moment that Weinstein’s lawyers 
managed to exploit a lack of knowledge or understanding in Perkins’ 
lawyer (again, this is speculation not fact), they are not necessarily 
protected simply by the fact that Perkins was represented. As the 
SRA notes, ‘solicitors involved in litigation [need not generally] … 
ensure that their opponents do not fall into traps of their own 
making’.42 But any misinformation around the clauses in the NDA 
might well be sufficient to lead to a ‘taking advantage’ finding.  
 It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the SRA to legislate 
in advance for all the possible meanings of unfair advantage. Equally, 
practitioners struggle with their ethical obligations when acting 
against an unrepresented party, worrying about an inherent 
unfairness to their client if they are seen to be helping their 
opponent. They are likely to find doubly problematic the risk of being 
seen to be ‘soft-pedalling’ with a represented opponent.  
 The A&O–SMB negotiation is a case in point. Was it for A&O 
or SMB to ensure the agreement was not unfair to Zelda Perkins? 
How far should a judgment on this reflect concerns about SMB’s 
decision, as alleged, to send in a two-year qualified solicitorto 
negotiate with a sizeable team from A&O and Miramax? If the 
evidence is correct, agreeing to turn over some of one’s attendance 
notes, the way in which the client, not the lawyer, seemed to be 
leading the negotiation, agreeing to Perkins’ not having a copy of the 
agreement, and the (apparent) failure to challenge terms which are 
manifestly excessive, all give rise to concerns about the quality of 
Zelda Perkins’s representation during the negotiation.  
 Mark Mansell suggested when giving evidence that his 
professional ethics were not impugned because  
 any situation like that, where you have an individual who is 
 legally advised, there is a negotiation, seeking to reconcile the 
 interests of the two parties. I think, in doing that, I am 
 compliant with my obligations.  
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I do not agree. Proving unfair advantage may be harder but not 
impossible in such circumstances; he is not relieved of responsibility 
by dint of a represented opponent. After all, one does not escape 
responsibility for throwing a punch by arguing one’s opponent should 
have moved their head. The key question is whether a punch was 
thrown, not whether the opponent should have moved. Asking for an 
unenforceable clause to be included is highly likely to be unfair if one 
accepts that it is misleading, or that it seeks to make a legal claim 
which has no substance.  
 Additionally, it imposes a significant practical detriment in 
that it forces the opponent to adhere to or challenge enforcement of 
such clauses. Those opponents are typically without the resources to 
mount such challenges. What is more, representation of the more 
vulnerable party is not continuous; the unfairness of the clauses 
continues after the agreement is executed. Furthermore, the NDA 
has a life beyond its creation. It can be designed to take advantage of 
the counter-party after they are represented. Most ex-employees are 
not going to retain lawyers to help them interpret their obligations 
under an NDA. Unfair advantage must be a particular concern given 
that Perkins was required to give warnings and assistance when 
compelled to give evidence, before she could seek legal advice. 
 The SRA document sensibly concludes with this reminder:  
 There will always be complex situations where maintaining 
 the correct balance between duties is not simple and all 
 matters must of course be decided on the facts. It is important 
 for solicitors to recognise their wider duties and not to 
 rationalise misconduct on the mistaken basis that their only 
 duty is to their client.43  
 
 These arguments become especially important when thinking 
about one string to Mr Mansell’s defence of himself before the 
WESC, which leads us towards situations where the tactics employed 
in a case, or clauses employed in a contract, are arguably legal. For 
Mr Mansell that was the argument that it might be proper to limit 
the disclosure of some material to the police. 
                                                          
43 ibid. 
IV. The Balancing Exercise 
How to interpret a clause shaping disclosure to the police evidence in 
professional ethics terms? Shaping disclosures to the police plainly 
can constitute perverting the course of justice. Mr Mansell may not 
have thought about that at the time; or he might have taken the view 
that the potential risks of that amounting to a perversion were not 
sufficiently strong or clearly spelled out in the law and that is 
sufficient for the clause to be permissible. So, for example, because 
there is not a case of a solicitor’s drafting a similar NDA and being 
successfully prosecuted for it, he might feel that the law is sufficiently 
uncertain for him to disregard potential restrictions in favour of his 
client. Or he might take the view that because one can articulate the 
view that a clause is potentially justifiable, because the law does not 
prohibit parties from exerting any influence on potential witnesses, it 
is in fact justified in the instant case. 
 Such an approach is consistent with the idea of professional 
minimalism I have set out elsewhere.44 Under professional 
minimalism, only unarguably illegal acts are restrained and the client 
gets all the benefit of uncertainty; a mere risk of perverting the 
course of justice is sanctified as legitimate by dint of private 
bargaining and representation. Professional minimalism legitimates 
decisions about, and therefore distances responsibility for, unsavoury 
tactics. Those decisions are often shielded by client confidentiality 
and legal professional privilege. The client can say ‘I was acting on 
advice’; and the lawyer can say ‘I was only following instructions.’  
 There are a number of reasons for giving clients the benefit 
of uncertainty. First, and importantly, it prevents lawyers from having 
to apply legal uncertainty against their own clients, bolstering loyalty. 
It is also usually in their commercial interests to align as fully as they 
can with clients. If they neglect their clients’ interests, there is the 
risk of being sued; whereas if they neglect the public interest in the 
administration of justice, the risk is lower. Indeed, it is rare for this 
neglect to be revealed, because lawyer and client interests are 
usually aligned, confidentiality protects the lawyer and the client 
from scrutiny, and enforcement is rare. Similarly, ethical and tactical 
dilemmas, and the psychological burdens of practising law, are 
simplified considerably when it is only if there is a clear breach of law 
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or professional ethics that lawyers must restrain the imperative to 
act in their clients’ interests. 
 Lawyers also see themselves as bound to accept their clients’ 
instructions on how to handle a case. This is wrong. Under their 
professional principles, they have an obligation to act with 
independence, and to consider their broader obligations to protect 
the rule of law and the administration of justice. They must take 
account of clients’ best interests when thinking about these issues, 
and the factors in the previous paragraph will generally encourage 
them to do so, but they are not to see themselves as absolved of 
responsibility for their decisions on the basis that they were just 
following the clients’ instructions. Responsibility and judgement are 
axiomatic to professionalism, and that judgement requires a rounded 
consideration of all the relevant professional rules and principles, not 
just the clients’ best interests. So lawyers have to decide for 
themselves whether deploying a tactic in settlement discussion is 
misleading or taking unfair advantage or not. As Lord Chief Justice 
Judge remarked:  
Something of a myth about the meaning of the client’s 
‘instructions’ has developed. As we have said, the client does 
not conduct the case. The advocate is not the client’s 
mouthpiece, obliged to conduct the case in accordance with 
whatever the client, or when the advocate is a barrister, the 
solicitor ‘instructs’ him. ... That is the foundation for the right 
to appear as an advocate, with the privileges and 
responsibilities of advocates and as an advocate, burdened 
with twin responsibilities, both to the client and to the court.45 
 
This case was about criminal advocacy, but the words apply doubly in 
civil contexts, especially in cases resolved away from the courts, 
where judges cannot exercise supervisory restraint. As a result, the 
balancing of ethical principles requires a more nuanced approach 
than saying ‘something is theoretically permissible, therefore I can do 
it’. The lawyer may be bound, if we come back to the PTCoJ frame, to 
think about what the likely and intended effects of the agreement 
were, not just what legitimate purposes the agreement could be put 
to. 
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V. Common Law and the Freedom of 
Contract 
The preceding analysis shows how professional ethics considerations 
turn partly on the enforceability of clauses, but also on concepts such 
as unfair advantage and protecting the rule of law and administration 
of justice. It also suggests the need for balance and judgement. An 
alternative view is that NDAs promote the rule of law through their 
facilitation of settlement agreements. Freedom of contract and the 
enforceability of contracts are important public interest concerns in 
their own right.  
 Freedom of contract is, of course fundamental to English 
commercial law.46 In essence, this means parties are free to make 
agreements, and the courts should enforce the terms of those 
agreements unperturbed by, even showing an ugly reverence for, 
sharp practice: ‘fairness has nothing to do with commercial contracts’ 
since ‘[c]ommercial parties can be most unfair and entirely 
unreasonable, if they can get away with it’.47 This view ignores the 
professional obligation not to take unfair advantage, and could be 
used to support a professionally minimalistic judgement about NDAs. 
 As MacMillan’s chapter48 shows us, contract law has a 
number of ways of suggesting that ‘getting away with it’ is subject to 
proper restraint (duress, illegality and so on). Non-disclosure 
agreements may be contracting out of the Equality Act 2010, even 
though section 144 renders any such term unenforceable unless it is 
a ‘qualifying settlement agreement’ (section 147). Section 43J of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 renders void any provision in an 
agreement that ‘purports to preclude the worker from making a 
protected disclosure’ (in very broad terms protecting whistle-blowers 
upon disclosure of crimes or other wrongs in the public interest to 
prescribed organisations).  
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 Freedom of contract depends on what the courts talk of as 
‘real choice’49 and the criticality of the assumption that ‘consent to 
the terms of the contract has been obtained fairly’.50 MacMillan’s 
plea for more critical focus on NDAs,51 and a broader recognition that 
the law on illegality is complex and voluminous,52 suggests courts 
may not take these restraints as seriously as they might. Only in the 
most unusual of cases will the resource constraints on employees be 
overcome. Persuading a court to believe that consent has been 
vitiated is difficult: being under pressure, or having a weak 
negotiating position, is not enough on its own.53 And, as we shall see 
in section VI, the courts seem willing to regard independent 
representation as enough to suggest that a real choice was properly 
exercised. 
VI. The Court Consideration of the Green 
Cases 
Freedom of contract was at the forefront of the decisions in the 
Philip Green/Arcadia/Topshop/Topman’s (the Group) injuncting of 
the Daily Telegraph.54 The newspaper sought to expose the Group’s 
use of NDAs to deal with alleged impropriety by Green. As the Court 
of Appeal noted in its ABC decision,55 five Group employees made 
allegations of ‘discreditable conduct’ against Green. All five cases 
were settled, with substantial payments made to the complainants. 
Confidentiality provisions were included in the agreements. All the 
complainants were reportedly independently advised. And the Court 
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of Appeal felt that ‘[t]he Agreements safeguarded the complainants’ 
rights to make legitimate disclosures (including reporting any criminal 
offences) if they chose’.56 That is, the Court of Appeal  thought the 
agreements did not fall foul of whistle-blowing legislation.  
 In July 2018, a Daily Telegraph journalist contacted the 
claimants for comments on the allegation and the NDAs. This 
suggested to the Group that  
the information in question had been disclosed to the 
newspaper by one or more of the complainants or by other 
employees who were aware of the information and of the 





At an early stage in the proceedings Nicklin J directed that 
attempts be made to ascertain the attitudes of the five 
complainants to whether information about their complaints 
should be published, even if they were not named. One 
complainant said that they were happy for their complaint, and 
the settlement, to be disclosed, provided they were not named. 
Two said that they supported the Claimants’ application for an 
injunction. One said they did not support the application.58 
 
We do not know how that information was forthcoming. Presumably, 
it was garnered by the lawyers for the Group, as only they would 
know the identities of the complainants. The court does not express 
any doubt about the depth and reliability of any of the complainants’ 
reported views on this matter. 
 The interim injunction application was unsuccessful at first 
instance, but successful in the Court of Appeal. There the Court 
weighed Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)  (‘Freedom of expression’) and ‘the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence (Article 10(2) ECHR); respect for 
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private and family life (Article 8(1) ECHR); and whether the court 
would be sufficiently likely to prohibit publication at a full trial. 
 ‘Sufficiently likely’ does not mean ‘more likely than not’ if the 
adverse consequences of disclosure seem sufficiently grave to the 
judge. One such adverse consequence was the impact on Green’s 
reputation. Various elements of public interest were in play too: the 
principle that there is no confidence in an iniquity; whether it was 
vital in the public interest to publish confidential information; and ‘a 
public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected 
by the law’. I note in passing that protection of reputation appears 
three times in the justifications offered by the Court: in Article 10(2) 
ECHR; in the softening of the likelihood test; and in the protection of 
confidences.  
 Balancing the competing interests required a test of 
proportionality,  
having regard to the nature of the information and all the 
relevant circumstances, [whether] it is legitimate for the owner 
of the information to seek to keep it confidential or whether it 
is in the public interest that the information should be made 
public.59  
 
 What seemed to weigh heavily in the balancing was that 
duties in such cases arose out of contract, especially  
where the obligation in question is contained in an agreement 
to compromise, or avoid the need for, litigation, whether 
actual or threatened. Provided that the agreement is freely 
entered into, without improper pressure or any other vitiating 
factor, and with the benefit (where appropriate) of independent 
legal advice, and (again, where appropriate) with due 
allowance for disclosure of any wrongdoing to the police or 
appropriate regulatory or statutory body, the public policy 
reasons in favour of upholding the obligation are likely to tell 
with particular force, and may well outweigh the article 10 
rights of the party who wishes to publish the confidential 
information.60 
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In this way, the Court of Appeal suggests that the public interest can 
be compromised by the creation of private rights at the end of a 
dispute. Putting aside the question of whether this is right in 
principle, central to the argument is that whistleblowing provisions 
were protected by the agreement. I disagree. And at the very least, 
even at the interim stage, this merits a more searching inquiry into 
the propriety of the agreement than the Court itself attempted in its 
published judgment. What did the Court pay attention to in reaching 
its decision?  
 The judges said they paid close attention to ‘reasonably 
credible’ evidence of wrongdoing (the harassment presumably), but 
there were ‘factors going the other way that need to be weighed in 
the balance at this, interlocutory, stage’, including ‘that the most 
serious allegations made by the complainants had been denied and 
that the settlement of the ET [Employment Tribunal]claims meant 
that the opportunity to have their truth determined by an 
independent tribunal had been lost’.61 They negate ‘reasonably 
credible’ evidence on the basis of a denial and a settlement that 
supports no factual finding either.  
 The first instance judge was criticised because he had ‘left 
entirely out of account the important and legitimate role played by 
[NDAs] in the consensual settlement of disputes, both generally but 
in particular in the employment field’.62 
There is no evidence that any of the Settlement Agreements 
were procured by bullying, harassment or undue pressure by 
the Claimants. Each Settlement Agreement records that the 
employee was independently advised by a named legal 
adviser. Each Settlement Agreement contained provisions 
authorising disclosure to third parties in a range of cases, 
including to regulatory and statutory bodies. They did not in 
the present case, therefore, on the face of the evidence at this 
interlocutory stage, have any of the unethical vices criticised 
by the WESC Report.63 
 
Here the Court of Appeal appears to be relying on the agreement 
itself and the existence of independent advice as evidence of fairness 
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and propriety. To rebut the presumption that the agreements were 
freely entered into, the defendant newspaper would have had to 
have evidence of the negotiations, which, presumably, would very 
likely reveal the confidentiality breaches of the employees 
themselves (or likely others subject to general duties of 
confidentiality as former or existing employees or advisers of the 
claimants). The agreement itself closes off this risk that such evidence 
would come to light: it shapes the course of justice in a way not 
recognised by the Court. 
 Second, and more fundamentally, it seems plausible that the 
Court of Appeal did not pay close enough attention to the terms of 
the NDA itself, because the agreements certainly did in my view 
create the very mischief with which the WESC was concerned. We 
can see this by looking at a now published NDA relating to one of the 
ex-employees of Arcadia given the pseudonym ‘Alex’. It was set out 
in an appendix to the last Arcadia judgment, given when the original 
injunction was discharged.64  
 The agreement indicates three types of compensation to be 
paid to Alex: a lump sum ‘for injury to feelings and aggravated 
damages’ in settling a tribunal claim (clause 4.1.1); a further lump 
sum in respect of compensation for the termination of Alex’s 
employment and any other claims against their employer and Sir 
Philip (or associates) (clause 4.1.2); and a third set of monthly 
compensation sums (paid until November 2018) for similar reasons 
(clause 4.1.3). 
 As part of the bargain, Alex is prohibited from disclosing 
information about the grievance, the termination of their 
employment and their claim (including the settlement of it), ‘save to 
immediate family/professional advisers,’ or ‘where required by any 
governmental, regulatory or other competent authority or by a Court 
of law or Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’. 
 Under clause 13 there are some further exceptions to the 
agreement: making a ‘protected disclosure’ (under whistleblowing 
legislation) is allowed for instance; as is ‘reporting a criminal offence 
to any law enforcement agency; and/or co-operating with any law 
enforcement agency regarding a criminal investigation or 
prosecution’. It follows that the agreement does appear to allow 
cooperation with, and reporting to, at least some law enforcement 
agencies. This explains the Court’s view that  
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 Each Settlement Agreement contained provisions authorising 
 disclosure to third parties in a range of cases, including to 
 regulatory and statutory bodies. They did not in the present 
 case, therefore, on the face of the evidence at this 
 interlocutory stage, have any of the unethical vices criticised 
 by the WESC Report.65 
 
 However, a very interesting question arises as to whether 
that apparently positive protection of whistle-blower rights is likely 
to be undone by clause 13.3, which states: 
You warrant, however, that you do not know of any 
circumstances which would lead you to making a disclosure in 
the form of or in the circumstances referred to in this clause. 
 
On breaching this warranty, Alex would be obliged to pay two out of 
the three heads of compensation received, recoverable as a debt, 
‘together with our costs, including legal fees, in doing so’. At least 
one of the NDAs to which this case relates involvesover £1million in 
compensation payments, so the repayment penalty might be high.  
 Leaving to one side whether this was an unenforceable 
penalty clause, one more fundamental and very interesting question 
raised by this clause is its likely and intended effect. Let us imagine I 
have been assaulted, possibly sexually, and yet promise that I do not 
know of any circumstances in which I would make a report of that 
conduct to the police. One interpretation is that I am being given 
rights to disclose, but I am promising never to exercise, or perhaps 
save in unforeseen circumstances, those rights. If I do, I may risk 
paying the indemnity and being placed in the compromising situation 
of having promised something that is contrary to what I know. That 
might be used in an attempt to discredit me later should I give 
evidence.  
 Analysing it under the PTCoJ framework, critical questions 
are raised about what is intended or likely as a result of the clause. 
Am I more likely not to disclose wrongdoing to an investigation of my 
own volition or if approached as a result of this clause? Is that its 
intended effect? It seems to me that a likely and foreseeable effect of 
the clause is that the former employee can report to or cooperate 
with legal investigations in theory, but would do so fearing the risks 
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of breaching the warranty. This would be particularly true if the 
employee could have envisaged, prior to signing the agreement, that 
they might be approached and asked to make a disclosure to a 
prosecutor, or if they could envisage changing their mind and 
disclosing to a law enforcement agency of their own volition, in which 
case any such disclosure might be said to indicate a breach of the 
warranty.  
 If that analysis of the clause is correct, it appears to be 
drafted with the intention of making it significantly less likely that 
Alex will disclose wrongdoing to, or cooperate with, a law 
enforcement agency or to an employee thinking of making a claim. It 
does not preclude the exercise of whistleblowing rights, but it does 
make their exercise illusory or close to it.  
 Now, we do not know what the parties say about the reasons 
for drafting that clause, and so we must remain circumspect, but on 
its face the clause gives rise to significant concerns. Whether this 
would fall within the ambit of PTCoJ depends a great deal on the 
persuasiveness of alternative explanations forthe clause.  
 One suggestion is that the agreement may be aimed at 
circumstances where there is an employee who has engaged in poor 
behaviour but there is no evidence of any criminal act. The employer 
is engaged in buying the silence of those with legitimate but non-
criminal complaints. The clausemight be intended to ensure that the 
signatory has disclosed all of the issues that may have occurred. 
Where a settlement is paid on the basis that everything is now dealt 
with, it gives the company a mechanism for clawing this back where 
the signatory comes out later with further issues that they had not 
disclosed.66 In this way it provides the employer with sufficient 
certainty they can settle ‘difficult’ cases.  
 Given the multiple complaints of harassment and other 
allegations made in the Green case about the probity of their 
handling (such as allegedly compromised internal investigations), it is 
hard to see how the lawyers involved could claim such purity of 
purpose. But one problem of principle with this interpretation is that 
rather than protecting the employer in other ways (eg mandating full 
disclosure of the allegations to the employer, and documenting those 
as part of the settlement), it seeks to warrant something that is likely 
to interfere with someone’s willingness to report a crime. It allows 
the private ordering of a public function that should not be interfered 
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with: there is a public interest in investigating allegations of iniquity, 
proportionately protected by allowing the subjects of NDAs to talk to 
the police unrestrained by cash for silence. The counter-parties to 
NDAs are not being allowed to trash the employer’s reputation, they 
are being permitted to make a complaint to, or cooperate with, the 
police. The main risk to the employer is that the police take that 
evidence seriously. This is not a risk they should be able to button 
down. It goes to the heart of a process that the offence of PTCoJ 
seeks to protect. 
 Use of warranties to ‘work round’ what would otherwise be 
seen as clear requirements under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998 may not be uncommon. The whistle-blowing charity Protect, for 
instance, reports that whistle-blowers can be required to warrant 
that the matter they have raised has been ‘satisfactorily concluded’, 
risking, on the face of such agreements, claims for repayment of 
compensation and costs should they disclose in a way that suggests 
they were not in fact satisfied.67 And they risk attacks on their 
credibility. Warranties can include the former employee’s being 
asked to promise that there are no circumstances of which they are 
aware that would amount to a breach of the regulatory requirements 
applicable to the company, even where the complaints they raised 
might or do in fact raise such concerns. Or that they withdraw all 
appeals/grievances, data protection requests and any complaints to 
any ombudsman or similar authority. And similarly agreements that 
provide for payment of  automatic indemnities if the individual 
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the statutory rights referred 
to in the agreement for Public Interest Disclosures (a less subtle 
version of Alex’s clause). On their face, and again subject to any 
proper explanations that can be offered, these seem to be deliberate 
attempts to frustrate whistle-blower protections.68 
 At least in circumstances where criminal and/or civil 
proceedings are in train, and probably where such proceedings are in 
contemplation, there is a significant potential that these agreements 
are likely to and intended to pervert the course of justice. If drafted 
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by a solicitor, on the face of the agreements alone, significant 
questions about breaches of the professional code are also raised for 
similar reasons to those discussed previously.  
 Even if one accepted that such clauses might, in certain 
circumstances, be legitimate, at the very least a judgment balancing 
the public interest suggests that the possibility that this clause would 
lead to interference should be canvassed by the court. It was not. 
They Court of Appeal judges showed themselves insensitive to the 
significant public interest challenges posed by the agreements 
instead protesting the public interest in enforcing them. They relied 
on a theoretical, decontextualised and inadequate understanding of 
the contract in the face of highly significant public interest concerns: 
it was an unbalanced balancing. A fair response in the instant case 
might be that this was an interim hearing, where the judges would 
not be expected to engage fully with the merits but seek simply to 
protect the status quo.69 I would have more sympathy with this 
argument had the Court not indicated that the agreement does not 
appear to give rise to the mischief complained of by the WESC. This 
incautious statement suggests a premature belief that the agreement 
was probably sound, when there were problems on its face. There is, 
though, a third point of concern that was not considered, which 
relates to arguments about costs. 
VII. The Costs Arguments 
The negotiation of NDAs takes place in a system of usually significant 
structural inequality: a soon-to-be or actually unemployed person 
presented with a compensation payment and an NDA on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. Where there is doubt about the appropriateness of an 
NDA in general, or in relation to specific terms, those concerns are 
likely either ignored or underplayed because: 
 there is a widespread practice of accepting NDAs, which means 
that any negotiations take place against an industry norm that 
accepts widespread and widely drawn non-disclosure 
agreements; 
 they are, or have been, seen as a useful way of managing 
reputational and legal risk – so even if not legally enforceable, 
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widely-drawn clauses help restrain most employees from 
discussing allegations of wrongdoing;  
 employees are often either unrepresented or under-represented 
(eg on limited retainers, where a lawyer advises on whether they 
can sign an NDA) and may, at the point of settlement, feel they 
have little alternative or interest in challenging the breadth of an 
NDA that they do not really understand; and 
 are operating in a system that concentrates on compensation on 
exit/dismissal as the main ex-post response to sexual harassment 
and discrimination. 
 
But I want to concentrate on one more specific element that calls 
into question the idea of a bargain freely chosen: costs.70 It is 
relevant to MacMillan’s arguments about duress.71 This relates to 
another element of the Green/Arcadia/TopShop agreements, which 
the court mentioned but did not reflect on: the size of the agreed 
compensation.  
 Ordinarily, employment cases would be pursued in the 
employment tribunal, although harassment cases might potentially 
be pursued through the courts. Sex discrimination claims arising out 
of employment can only be pursued in the Employment Tribunal.72 
Ordinarily, each party bears its own costs, win or lose, although a 
tribunal can make an exceptional award for unreasonable conduct. 
Employers have been known to argue that failure to accept a 
settlement is unreasonable conduct, including failure to accept an 
NDA (although such arguments are generally, if perhaps not always, 
unsuccessful).73  
 As Regan has noted, a respondent wishing to secure an NDA 
can make ‘an enhanced offer to settle if an NDA were executed’.74 
That is, they offer more than the maximum award to which a 
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claimant is entitled,75 or is likely to be awarded (possibly including a 
payment of unrecoverable costs), on condition that an NDA is signed. 
Let us call these ‘over-par offers’, being offers that cannot realistically 
be beaten in any final hearing. Over-par offers put the claimant 
wishing to resist an NDA in a difficult situation. Financially, the offer 
may come at a time of great financial vulnerability. Moreover, if they 
are funded under a no-win-no-fee agreement, the solicitor may 
decide to withdraw from representing them unless they accept the 
offer; if they are insured, the insurer may similarly withdraw on the 
basis that a (more than reasonable) offer of compensation has been 
made; the same is true for union funding.76 If the claimant were 
funding themselves they would be able to proceed, but only if they 
were willing to risk substantial accumulation of legal costs and a 
potential application to the tribunal that they had been 
unreasonable. Such an award of costs might be very unlikely but 
nonetheless used to put pressure on the claimant. 
 The situation may be even worse for claims taken to a court, 
not a tribunal. Given that costs ordinarily follow the event, a claimant 
declining any reasonable offer can suffer costs penalties, for example 
by reason of offers without prejudice save as to costs that may wipe 
out or exceed their compensation. Any over-par offer is likely to be 
unbeatable, putting the claimant at significant risk. Regan reports 
phone-hacking litigation as an area where over-par settlements were 
offered to ensure settlement with NDAs. The size of the settlements 
reported in the Green case raises a suggestion that such may have 
been the tactic here. Such costs penalties might well exceed any 
compensation awarded, even assuming the claims were successful. 
Regan puts it thus: 
[A] defendant has the capacity to throw money at a claim and 
seek to buy it off. I have no personal knowledge of recent 
claims but, if press reports are accurate, it would appear that 
victims of sexual and racial discrimination have accepted sums 
which would never be remotely recoverable in a Tribunal or 
Court case. They cannot be compelled to keep quiet but the 
                                                          
75 For example, unfair dismissal cases are ordinarily subject to a maximum of £83,682 
or 52 weeks’ net pay, whichever is the lower. 
76 ‘No Help for Doctor Who Refused to be Gagged' The Times (30 January 2012) 
available at www.thetimes.co.uk/article/no-help-for-doctor-who-refused-to-be-
gagged-s3g5073phq3. 
financial threat they face is overwhelming and there are law 
firms which boast of their ability to ‘protect reputations’.77 
VIII. Conclusions 
The problems seen in the Green and Weinstein–Perkins agreements 
are suggestive of an interesting set of tensions. Contract law purports 
to protect freedom but here instantiates the silencing of women in 
ways that, I have argued, are professionally problematic. In showing 
that they may sometimes be potentially criminal, I have concentrated 
on showing how contractual freedom can be taken to extremes: de 
facto, through the professional failings of the lawyers involved; and, 
given decisions in Green, de jure, shielding the powerful from 
scrutiny without that same contract law’s being effectively engaged 
because the contract ‘looks okay on its face’ when in my opinion it 
looks highly questionable. 
 The importance of professionalism in the drafting of 
contracts has been bolstered by the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s 
Warning Notice on NDAs. It provides guidanceagainst the abuse of 
NDAs, covering some, but not all, of the points raised in this 
chapter.78 In particular it warns against the  
 use of NDAs as a means of improperly threatening litigation 
 or other adverse consequences, or otherwise exerting 
 inappropriate influence over people not to make disclosures 
 which are protected by statute, or reportable to regulators or 
 law enforcement agencies.79 
 
 Whether contract law pays sufficient attention to the kinds of 
issues I have raised here is moot. What is striking is how irrelevant 
duress and other attacks on the NDAs were to a consideration of 
their interim enforceability. The possibility that the indemnities in the 
Green case were unenforceable penalties got only the slightest of 
mentions. Professional enforcement now beckons against Mr 
                                                          
77 Regan, ‘Written Submissions’ (n 70). 
78 SRA, ‘Use of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs): Solicitors Regulation Authority’ 
(12 March 2018) available at  www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/guidance/warning-
notices/use-of-non-disclosure-agreements-ndas--warning-notice/. 
79 Ibid. 
Mansell,80 and a similar fate may await the drafter of Mr Green’s 
NDAs. We shall see.  But whilst nice arguments about freedom turn 
the heads of contract lawyers, the regulators are showing signs of 
being more concerned with the inappropriate application of 
professional power. 
 
                                                          
80 ‘SRA Attempts to Prosecute A&O Lawyer over Controversial Weinstein Gagging 
Deal’ Legal Business (3 April 2019) available at www.legalbusiness.co.uk/blogs/sra-
attempts-to-prosecute-ao-lawyer-over-controversial-weinstein-gagging-deal/. 
